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iSUMMARY
Halting the spread of WMD (nuclear, biological and chemical) and their delivery systems has become
an international security  top priority for the entire international community. This is mainly due to the fact, that
the risk of NBC weapons' use by rogue states is greater today than in past centuries. Within NATO, the
proliferation problem has adquired relevance beacause it is potentially detrimental to the Alliance's new strategy
and specially, because it can undermine NATO's ability to conduct essential defence missions.  Therefore, as it
was recently recognized by the Alliance's DPC and NPG Ministerial Meetings on June 12, 1997, "the
intensification of Allied defence efforts to address this risk, is an integral part of the Alliance adaptation to the new
security environment. Alliance defense planning must address the potential threat or use of NBC weapons in future
contingencies involving proliferants".
Traditional responses to the proliferation problem have been diplomatic and political, rather than military.
The implementation of military measures to counter the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, opened an
acute debate between the United States (which launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in December
1993), and those that saw the proposal as an unilateral initiative by which the US would have new justifications
to retain and manufacture new nuclear weapons and therefore, with serious and dangerous consequences for the
nonproliferation regime and its main legal international instrument, the NPT. For these reasons, during the two
first years, the debate was focused on the relation and compatibility of the counterproliferation initiative with the
nonproliferation regime. The solution given both by the US and NATO, made clear that counterproliferation
should be a last resort option, once the nonproliferation measures failed, so that counterproliferation should be a
mere supplement of the nonproliferation regime.
NATO´s role in this field has been decisive, since the Alliance discussed for the first time the
counterproliferation initiative in January 1994, with occasion of the Brussels summit.  In spite of  the reticencies
to incorporate the concept "counterproliferation" in its vocabulary (preferring the term "defense response to the
weapon of mass destruction proliferation risk"), the Alliance has been the vehicle to internationalize the
counterproliferation policy on its own bases, through the set up of two working groups, one centred in the political
aspects of the initiative and another focussed on its military implications.
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1INTRODUCTION
"The intensification of Allied defence efforts to address the risks posed by nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery means, is an integral part of Alliance adaptation to the new security
environment. Alliance defence planning must address the potential threat or use of NBC weapons in future
contingencies involving proliferants. As part of Ministerial Guidance we issued guidance on the capabilities
needed to deter, and if necessary respond to, the use of such weapons. We agreed that these capabilities were
among the key areas for longer term planning and that a high priority should be given to these capabilities in the
1998 force proposals".1
Since Les Aspin, by then US Defense Secretary, launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
(DCI) in a speech before the National Academy of Sciences on December 7, 1993, both the USA and NATO have
been actively working in defining and implementing such an initiative not only at the military level, but also at
the diplomatic and political one. But it was also since the initiative came to light, when a lot of criticism was put
on the proposal, beginning with the lack of a clear definition about what should be understood under the term
"counterproliferation". This fact originated  suspicions of other countries towards the initiative, seeing in this the
American will to recover protagonism in nonproliferation issues and therefore, an exclusively unilateral concept.
The other matter of concern was the relation between the counterproliferation initiative and the
nonproliferation regime.  The fear that the "new counterproliferation" policy could supplant the "traditional
nonproliferation regime", or  concerns about the possible damage that a military conception of nonproliferation
may inflict on the regime (before the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference),
focused also the debate during the first years of the initiative. In spite of these critics, we will see that, non- and
counterproliferation can "live together" if the appropriate rules and procedures are observed.
The debate continued when in late 1993 the U.S. persuaded NATO to create two working groups on
counterproliferation, which will explore its political and military aspects. The discussions that take place within
NATO from January 1994, proved that there was no agreement among the allies and that if the U.S. wanted to
obtain the support for its counterproliferation initiative (necessary in order to convert what until that moment was
exclusively a domestic and unilateral policy in a international and multilateral one), this should also deal with its
political implications, rather than be exclusively focused in its military aspects.
2Although not always openly admitted, NATO contribution in addressing the weapons of mass destruction
challenge, has been decisive and impressive. In this sense, and in spite of  the reticencies to incorporate the word
"counterproliferation" in its vocabulary (preferring its own term "defense response to the weapon of mass
destruction proliferation risk"), the Alliance has been the vehicle to internationalize the counterproliferation policy
on its own bases.
But the counterproliferation debate has had reciprocal beneficial influences. It has served to prove
NATO's ability  both, to respond effectively to the weapon of mass destruction and missile threat, and to its
adaptation to the new security environment and the most important stimulus to force planning and defense analysis
in the decades ahead.2
After almost four years of the counterproliferation initiative launching, we consider a good moment to
evaluate their successes, failures and prospects by debating the questions exposed above and analysing NATO's
role within the global efforts (i.e. the nonproliferation regime) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
This study has been prepared thanks to a grant of the 1995/1997 NATO Fellowship Program.
3I. THE CONCEPTUAL DEBATE
"When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather  scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less". "The question is", said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many things".
"The question is", said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."3
From its inception, the Defense Counterprolferation Initiative (DCI) prompted a great deal controversy
in the United States and abroad. Supporters and critics alike struggled first to define the concept and then, to
understand its implications for nonproliferation, deterrence, arms procurement, development of new technologies,
and intelligence collection.4 For this reason, during a long time, the counterproliferation debate was centred on the
searching of a precise meaning of the term (to ascertain what was meant to be achieved by it and to determinate
how their purposes should be reached).
Therefore, attention should be paid, first, to the emergence and evolution of the counterproliferation
initiative in order to answer the question,how was the counterproliferation concept born? and, where is the
inflection point between nonproliferation and counterproliferation?; second, as it has been already said,  the
counterproliferation concept itself and their elements should be defined, taking into consideration different
approaches and specially, if counterproliferation could be an effective mean of combatting proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) -without duplicate efforts, i. e., the relation between counterproliferation measures
 and the nonproliferation regime, an aspect that will be specially studied in part III of our report- and if so, how
it works.
1. From nonproliferation to counterproliferation: the counterproliferation initiative background
The first indirect approach to the counterproliferation initiative was realized by Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney, when he created in April 1990 a directorate for Proliferation Countermeasures (PC). Previously, in 1989,
the Bush administration, led by Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfwitz, decided to change the orientation and
mission of Defense Department. To fight proliferation in all its aspects, by means ranging from the control of dual-
use technology to the preventive destruction of weapons of mass destruction's  facilities, became a new priority
for the U.S. military.5
4Unlike the Clinton counterproliferation initiative, which followed it some years later, the objective of the
PC directorate (composed by no more than 12 people) had little to do with determining how the U.S. military
might deter or preempt other nations' use of nuclear, chemical or biological (NBC) weapons. Indeed, the
Proliferation Countermeasures directorate's first set of research projects (it commissions over $2 million in studies)
focused less on  WMD than on high leverage conventional weapons systems, that might inflict strategic harm (and,
thus, become of proliferation concern) if effective military countermeasures were not developed.6
To be sure, the directorate worried about how best to limit the damage that NBC weapons (and ballistic
missiles carried them) might make. Passive and active defenses (including missile defenses, protective gear,
dispersion of forces, and offensive strikes once war began) were all studied. But the directorate was under no
delusion that truly effective military countermeasures were likely against these weapons: measures could be taken
to limit the damage they might do, but countermeasures to neutralize them effectively in the way that effective
military electronic countermeasures can negate enemy radars, did not seem likely.7
The directorate established a Department of Defense Proliferation Countermeasures Working Group, that
included representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the various military
services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The working group's first project was to assess the threat that accurate Third
World conventional ballistic missiles might present to U.S. expeditionary forces in the late 1990.8 This was
followed by an examination of what threats, both lethal and nonlethal, unnamed air vehicles (cruise missiles and
reconnaissance remotely piloted vehicles) might present with improved command, control, communication and
intelligence capabilities, and satellite services.9 The aim of each of these studies was to anticipate possible
proliferation problems well enough in advance to allow policy makers and military planners enough time, either
to diffuse them or to get properly preapared literally to fight them. In this sense, after the Persian Gulf War,
nonproliferation will be replaced by "more combative" means.10
 The view that nuclear weapons should play a role in a counterproliferation context, was first contained
in the  Reed/Wheeler report of 1991.11 This discussion was taken up by professional military planners and by the
American nuclear weapons laboratories. General Lee Butler, Chief of Strategic Command, had asked his planners
5to design computer models that would enable President Clinton to aim nuclear weapons at third World states.
General Butler allegedly ordered these studies in anticipation of future demand by the political authorities but
without prior consultation with Defense Secretary Les Aspin.12 Nevertheless, the issue will also be evaluated by
Defense Nuclear Posture Review ordered by Aspin in October 1993 (the so-called Bottom-Up-Review) which
processed the lessons learned in the Gulf War. In short, DoD's motivation for its counterproliferation strategy
derived largely from a convergence of two factors: 1) military necessity resulting from the Gulf War experience
with Iraq and, 2) a reorientation of the U.S. conventional force structure as a result of the Bottom-Up Review.
The Bottom-Up Review was developed in the context of a strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement"
that emerged as speeches during the first months of 1993.13 T e Review will discuss the future role of nuclear
weapons in contingencies outside the East-West context. One of the six working groups responsible for drawing
up the review, will examine the role of  nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy, a second will look at the
relationship between the United States' nuclear posture and its counterproliferation policy.14 The Bottom-Up
Review will also decide wether the United States should adopt an unconditional no first use policy or to plan for
potential nuclear strike in response to attacks against U.S. forces with chemical or biological weapons. Finally,
the Review concluded that U.S. could cope with the challenge of two nearly simultaneous Major Regional
Contingencies (MRCs) with a force structure 40 per cent smaller than the peak years of the eighties.15
On December 7, 1993, after months briefings on what the Counterpoliferation Initiative might be (and
two months after the Bottom-Up Review), Les Aspin officially launched at a speech to the US National Academy
of Sciences in Washington the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI), to address challenges to United
States security in a potentially more threatening post-Cold War international environment.16 The DCI attemp d
to ensure that if states acquire weapons of mass destruction, their programs would be finished by force. It seeked
to provide, in effect, technological and military insurance against political and diplomatic failure. Les Aspin
stressed that "with this initiative, we are making the essential change demanded by this threat... We are adding the
task of protection to the task of prevention". In contrast with the old nuclear danger posed to the United States by
the Soviet nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, Les Aspin observed that "the new nuclear danger we face is
perhaps a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist groups".
6Finally, Aspin also stated that "in past administrations, the emphasis was on prevention. The policy of
non-proliferation combined global diplomacy and regional security efforts with the denial of material and know-
how to would-be proliferators. Prevention remains our preeminent goal... The DCI in no way means we will lessen
our non-proliferation efforts. In fact, DoD's work strengthens prevention. What the DCI recognizes, however, is
that proliferation may still occur. Thus we are adding protection as a major policy goal".
Although Aspin left the Pentagon right after announcing the Counterproliferation Initiative, he made sure
that it would be more than a mere speech. First, established a new post for  Mr. Asthon Carter as Assistant
Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation. Second, he instructed the military services to identify
research and acquisition programs that needed to be founded for the services to accomplish their
counterproliferation mission. He also had his deputy, John Deutch, make counterproliferation an acquisition
priority. Finally, he saw to it that language was introduced in the National Defense Authorisation Act for fiscal
year 1994, requiring the new Secretary of Defense to identify precisely what new spending was needed to execute
the initiative.17
On the other hand, the timing of the launching of the counterproliferation initiative coincides with a
special moment of tense relations between the United States and North Korea, that with an eye on the
nonproliferation regime debates surrounding the extension of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
It is the reason by which a lot of specialists saw the initiative as a risk for the future of the nonproliferation regime,
and specially of its main legal instrument, the NPT.18
      
1993 was a difficult year for nonproliferation issues. The year was marked by a growing concern in the
United States and Europe about safety and future of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal after the USSR
political disintegration (Moscow changed from being a partner in the nonproliferation regime to being a part of
the problem);19 the ongoing of Iraq and Iran's nuclear capabilities aspirations; start-up operations relative to the
signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the fears of "nuclearization" in the Asia-Pacific region.
Finally, the counterproliferation strategy was applied in mid-1993, in the tracking and subsequent inspection of
7the Yin He, the Chinese vessel thought to be carrying precursors for chemical weapons destinated for Iran.20 Good
news on the nonproliferation field were few. But just as the international community was beginning to debate the
most important points related to the NPT question (cutoffs in fissile materials, the discriminatory nature of the
NPT, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -CTBT-, strengthening of existing verification and monitoring
capabilities, disposal of fissile material, and dismantling of nuclear weapons) the emergence of a
counterproliferation initiative sent the debate in new directions.21 All the ab ve mentioned developments elevated
nonproliferation to the top of the international policy priorities. Some U.S. analysts stressed: "if we are on the
verge of a new era of proliferation, new policies may be required to protect U.S. interests and national security".22
The crisis with Iraq and North Korea in the autumn of 1994 confirmed the validity of the two major regional
conflict threat envisioned by the Bottom-Up Review. This situation opens a debate, first, in the U.S. and second
within NATO, centred in evaluate if nonproliferation policies could meet future changes. The May 1994 Deutsch
Defense Department report to Congress, recommending an annual increase in spending of about $400 million on
14 counterproliferation programs starting in 1996, will be the response to such changes.23
2. What is counterproliferation?
The fact that Les Aspin did not precisely define in his December 1993 speech the counterproliferation
concept contributed from the very first moment to create a lot of confusion on what should really be understood
under this new and ambiguous concept.
Buy this time, some analysts introduced the concept "anti-proliferation" (a post-Cold War era concept, that
incorporated the traditional nonproliferation agenda as well as new elements -political, economic, and also military
ones in an integrated strategy- responding to the political and military implications of the proliferation process
itself in the international system)  which purposely differed from counterproliferation.24 Neverthel ss, this concept
neither helped to clarify the counterproliferation debate.
 
In the weeks following Secretary Aspin's announcement of the DCI, debates broke out between State and
Defense, and even within the Defense Department, over what the initiative covered. Some officials wanted all
proliferation concerns including advanced conventional weapons to be included; others did not. There also were
8disagreement over who was in control of the initiative. Therefore, by January of 1994 the National Security
Council staff was fully engaged in these definitional, managerial questions and in February had finally brokered
a set of definitions that both the State and Defense Departments could accept.
By that time, the National Security Council memorandum on "Agreed Definitions" defined proliferation
as "the spread of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and missiles used to deliver them" and
counterproliferation as "the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat
proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with
particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces and interests can be protected, should they confront an adversary
armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles".25
This definition, although somewhat confusing -and insuficient-, had three clear advantages. First, it
avoided the vagueness inherent to any set of prescriptive definitions. Being prescriptive might help clarify why
weapons of mass destruction were of proliferant concern and what else might qualify and why, but such definitions
were certain to generate the very kind of debates the memo was crafted to avoid. Second, by limiting "proliferation"
to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them, the conventional military systems and dual-use
items that the U.S. wanted to export could be kept out of the web of nonproliferation controls. Finally, by keeping
"nonproliferation"  as the comprehensive term to describe America's efforts against the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, the policy focus was kept on the most horrible and indiscriminate weapons and on traditional
international and U.S. nonproliferation policies (see part II of this report).26
Nevertheless, in the U.S., confusion continued to reign, so much by late April 1994 Assistant Secretary
for Defense,  Asthon Carter, issued a statement before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States
Senate.27 As tools of counterproliferation, Carter mentioned "diplomacy, arms control, export controls, intelligence
collection and analysis with particular responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected"
if they are confronted by an adversary armed with WMD or missiles.
An interesting interpretation of the concept was given in
9a June 28, 1994 report by the Congressional Research Service entitled: "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapon Proliferation: Potential Military Countermeasures". Dealing with military measures of
counterproliferation, the report referred to "actions that might inhibit, prevent, or reverse the spread of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons if diplomatic and economic pressures prove insufficient". This approach means
that counterproliferation measures can be taken once the traditional nonproliferation means have failed, although
in the same report is said that "nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies and programs are closely
related.28
Within the board spectrum of military measures that form part of the counterproliferation can be
identified: first, interdiction operations designed to prevent proliferator from adquired nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) related materials, finished products, and/or economic sustenance; second, neutralize skilled
scientists, technicians, and program managers without whom proliferation would slow or stop; third, nonlethal
instruments such as supersticky forms and computer viruses to disable or disrupt NBC processes for long periods;
fourth, instills qualms among first-generation proliferators by making them fearful that Special Operations Forces
might seize the few finished weapons they have produced; fifth, relies on explosives to terminate NBC programs
and finally, to attack NBC delivery vehicles.29 All of the above measures have subjected to specific requirements
and posses some risks and repercussions.
On the other hand, a great effort has been made (both by the U.S. Department of Defense -DoD- and by
NATO) in order to explain that counterproliferation not only covers active measures by military units, but also,
support for international arms control regimes and its need to adjust NBC deterrent and warfighting strategies,
tactics, doctrines, plans, procedures, and force postures to cope with weapons of mass destruction.
For this reason, the DoD's counterproliferation doctrine (and to some extend the one of NATO) combines
preemption with a credible deterrent posture to dissuade acquisition, transfer, or use of WMD, i.e. This aspect
of counterproliferation builds on classical deterrent theory.30 While the term protection implies a defensive
orientation against the identified threat, the DoD's counterproliferation concept involves offensive capabilities as
well. So while theatre ballistic missile defenses, for example, are a part of this strategy, it also includes capabilities
to destroy underground facilities and to seek out mobile missiles, as it has been said.
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But the first and most important difficulty of this conception is to know what is the decision process by
which various counterproliferation measures are triggered and, how is  their method of application and timing
determined. It is the reason why some analysts stress that "in absent of clear indications to the contrary, one must
understand that counterproliferation is a measure of last resort, to be used before armed conflict ensues".31
On the other hand, it should be observed that the concept of using military force against WMD is not
new, although it had not previously been incorporated into a formal military strategy. The best-known case of
preemptive counterproliferation is Israel's destruction of Baghdad's Osiraq nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981. Iraq's
nuclear activities were previously impeded on two prior occasions. In April 1979, a reactor core due to be shipped
to Iraq was sabotaged while in storage in La Seyne-sur-Mer, France, and in September 1980, the Iranian air force
bombed the Osiraq research facility. The first known case of a preemptive military attack on a nuclear installation
took place during World War II, when the Norwegian underground sabotaged the States forces destroyed Japan's
nascent nuclear weapon program immediately after Japan surrendered in 1945.32
Another useful definition (made by the Russian Ambassador's Oleg Grinevsky), suggests a formula of
counterproliferation: protection + prevention + preemption + neutralization.33 For Ambassador Grinevsky, by
defining counterproliferation only as "protection and prevention" (as it was defined by the USA), it is not at all
different from nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it should be added the elements preemption, that
means the liquidation with power projection methods of the weapons of mass destruction before the beginning of
a crisis, and eutralization, which means the destruction of already deployed WMD during a crisis or a war.
Nevertheless, the main difficulty in accepting  this definition is that goes further away  than the initial American
DCI.
Although some Pentagon officials privately admitted that counterproliferation still envisions preemptive
military strikes, more senior officials, especially Assistant Secretary of Defense Asthon Carter, explicitly and
repeatly disavowed any such role. This is also the approach adopted by NATO, which has consistently ruled out
any military action that is not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.34
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For Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, counterproliferation has had four different definitions (although
the first one could not be successfully implemented by the Bush administration in 1989).35 The one that has
aroused the most attention, applause and hostility has been: "counterproliferation as offensive military actions to
eliminate the WMD capabilities, including the production facilities, of proliferators. This concept (in spite of the
Clinton administration efforts to explain that this is not what counterproliferation means), remain alive, most
particularly within the air force.
The second definition identifies counterproliferation with nonproliferation, as performance by the DoD
(but as Müller and Reiss stress, this definition contains its own contradictions since counterproliferation deals with
counterforce and nonproliferation did not).
Finally, counterproliferation involves preparing U.S. forces to fight and survive in a WMD environment.
This delimits a specific set of activities, from intelligence collection to doctrine, procurement, and training, that
is comprehensible and amounts to prudent contingency planning. Under this definition preventive diplomacy
remains the first, and by far the most important, line of defense against the spread of WMD. Neutralization
operations against WMD stocks and programs during combat is a subordinate, if inevitable, option, while pride
of places is accorded to protective rather than counterforce measures.36
3. Elements and requirements
The two fundamental premises on which the rationale for counterproliferation is based today are, first,
that since or as a result of the end of the Cold War (and as a result of the Gulf War and the North Korea nuclear
crisis), the proliferation problem has dramatically worsened, and, second, that proliferation now presents such a
risk that force should and will be applied if necessary to stop it.37
The key elements of a comprehensive counterproliferation strategy includes (at least):38 diplomacy
(diplomacy responses should be the centerpiece of the counterproliferation strategy, as they have been of
12
nonproliferation policy); deterrence (it will play a major role in responding to new nuclear powers);39 arms cont ol
(support for strengthening the NPT, the CTBT, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention, among others, and establishing effective instrument and measures for dealing with WMD
as an essential task); coercive and cooperative disarmament (coercive on the model of Iaq and cooperative on the
model of the former Soviet Union); Economic and Military Assistance (as disincentives to proliferation, although
their efficacy has been questioned in Pakistan); sanctions and embargoes (another possible response to
proliferation); intelligence (to support military operations for counterproliferation purposes, providing near real-
time information on a proliferat's activities, facilities, sites, and the like); export controls (denial of key military
or dual-use technologies to proliferant countries through domestic and international controls on exports has been
a key instrument of nonproliferation policy, and this approach will continue to be used in the future);40 security
assurances (negative and positive assurances should be explored in a counterproliferation strategy) and guarantees;
stabilizing measures (by using political and technological measures that might enhance stability in regions were
proliferation has occurred); adapting response capabilities (improving and expanding capabilities of both Nuclear
Emergency Search Team, which interdicts nuclear weapon threats by means of device detection, diagnostics,
disablement, safing, securing, removal, disassembly and destruction, and the Accident Response Group, which
delivers an emergency response to victims of a nuclear attack or accident; developing similar capabilities for
responding to other WMD is needed); lethal and nonlethal countermeasures (new physical countermeasures for
mitigation or interdiction are needed); active and passive defenses (developing active defenses against theatre and
strategic missile attacks) and finally, the military operations (military countermeasures against cruise missiles,
including offensive counterstrikes against launchers, plus active and passive defenses, integrated within programs
to counter ballistic missiles)41.
By summarising: the counterproliferation policy is intended to: prevent and roll back WMD proliferation,
to deter the use of WMD, to adapt military forces and planning to deal with WMD in the battlefield. Military
planing focuses on: deterring the use or threat of use of WMD, for example by developing better protective
equipment against CBW system; improving capability to destroy enemy stockpiles of WMD and improving active
(eg missile) and passive (eg detention and physical protection systems) defense.42
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The counterproliferation strategy includes an active and advanced program of technological development
which is essential to the success of the initiative and to address new contingencies. The technological support in
areas  such as command, control, communications and intelligence support, counterforce, active and passive
defenses and proliferation prevention (but also the more problematic proliferation preemption)43 should be
especially considered.44 In a comprehensive strategy, the counter-proliferation options must support and not
undermine traditional non-proliferation measures, such as the strengthening inspections of nuclear reactors and
other facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the verification of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) implementation.45
Finally, counterproliferation also need political, economic  (in terms of affordability)46 and international
support (an aspect that will be developed in part III of our report). Since counterproliferation involves a direct
military response to proliferation of WMD, the use of the military counterproliferation operations might prove
politically damaging and legally unacceptable and create domestic and international
political problems. There is to remember that many proliferation programs are not seen by the international
community as a serious danger for the rest of the States, and therefore, clandestine actions to extract civilian
scientists, sabotage enemy NBC installations, and disrupt the activities of sovereign nations through the use of
computer viruses, all in "peacetime", also could cause serious domestic and international repercussions if
discovered.47
The possible legal problems of the counterproliferation initiative should be also considered. Traditionally,
International  Law has  permitted states, in applications of the so-called "coercive  measures" in response to a
violation of an imperative international "ius cogens" norm ("erga omnes") which  constitutes an  "international
crime", to use the force if sanctioned  by the U.N. Security  Council (since the qualification of the  violation as
"international crime" corresponds exclusively to it and  therefore, also the discrectional power to use  the military
force  based in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter), or in self-defense  against armed aggression. Nevertheless, the
 used of the force in  the contemporary International Law is  precisely  codified and  therefore, the use of this  in
preemptive  operations  could result problematic under a legal point of view.48 Furthermore, the  application of
counterproliferation  measures  can  result in some  cases as  disproportionate if there  is  not a "tangible or
14
imminent threat" a fact that  represent an additional problem, since the International Law  responsibility  principle,
and in  particular, the application  of  countermeasures is based, among others, on the necessity to offer a
proportional response.
15
II. THE CRITICS: NONPROLIFERATION VS. COUNTERPROLIFERATION
"Proliferation is likely to be the top continuous U.S. national security challenge for the next ten to twenty
years. If we are to confront the proliferation challenge successfully, we must be clear as to what we are talking
about and how we will respond". I am not quite sure, for example, about the difference between
counterproliferation and nonproliferation" (U.S. Senator Sam Nunn).49
From the very first moment of the counterproliferation initiative, one of the most controversial aspects
was the relation between the nonproliferation regime and the counterproliferation policy (the so-called
"counterproliferation debate"). This was, because originally, counterproliferation was defined by some in the U.S.
as an alternative to nonproliferation (in order to replace them), or as the successor policy when nonproliferation
failed. This suggested that the United States was abandoning the nonproliferation effort in the wake of the
unsettling discoveries about the weakness of the existing regime in safeguarding nuclear materials.50 As a
consecuence, accusations have been made that the new school of though in the U.S. is so deliberately distancing
itself from the traditional concept of nonproliferation that it deserves a label of its own neo-nonprol feration.51
            
The main critic to the counterproliferation initiative was precisely that it could not take precedence over
the nonproliferation regime, since this last binds the overwhelming majority of the world's states, while
counterproliferation is applicable only to a very small minority. Therefore, nonproliferation was seen as the pivotal
and primary objective, and counterproliferation could only remain an appendix to the priority task of
nonproliferation; if counterproliferation measures and nonproliferation objectives are contradictory, the
nonproliferation should prevail.
Furthermore, the nonproliferation regime was seen as a non imposed or imperial structure, built on the
consensus of the overwhelming majority of its members. Only such a consensus enables parties to identify, isolate
and punish those who break the rules. This applies to regime rules in general, and for serious decisions like the
decision to apply force in particular.52 For this reason, the possibility that NATO or some of its member states
could take such a decision on their own should be excluded.
Nonproliferation has after many years managed to make a place for itself in international relations,
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accepting, although many at times grudgingly, as an indispensable element of pease an security: It has acquired
the status of international norm, arising form understandings shared by many nations and applied with the
agreement of those nations. However, the traditional nonproliferation regime, only provides for traditional, non-
violent, means of enforcement, ranging from export restrictions, through diplomatic reprisals, to sanctions. Such
measures are not part of the counterproliferation, an aspect that served the non-proliferation specialists to further
justify the supremacy of the nonproliferation regime on the counterproliferation policy.53
On the other side, the "nonproliferation sceptics" argued  that "it is difficult to understand why people
maintain such a faith in the efficiency of the NPT, when both Iraq and North Korea, signatories to the treaty, have
been patently bent on developing their nuclear stockpiles".54 Nevertheless, we do not share this believe, since we
think that the efficiency of the NPT as major legal international instrument to avoid the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, has been sufficiently proved. Disagreements in this field basically are over priorities and objectives.55
Both analysis forget that counterproliferation and nonproliferation are two different but complementary
concepts (as the 1991 Gulf War showed). Nevertheless, as it has been already said, in a comprehensive strategy
the counterproliferation measures must support and not undermine traditional nonproliferation. The
nonproliferation regime has not collapsed, as suggested in the wake of the Gulf war. On the contrary, in light of
this and its aftermath an incremental improvement of the responses, the regime has traditionally made to the
nuclear weapon proliferation threat, was activated: supporting and strengthening the NPT and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards -through the so-called program 93+2-; strengthening and expanding export
control measures, particularly in dual-use areas;56 strengthening enforcement and compliance mechanism directed
against proliferators (these mechanism may be both unilateral and multilateral) and finally, promoting regional
arms control and openness, transparency, and confidence-building measures.57
As a consecuence of this debate", the Pentagon's view on the relationship between non- and
counterproliferation  considerably evolved in order to offer a "new image" of the counterproliferation initiative not
based on terms of superiority but being "complementary". In this sense, two "conciliatory" documents should be
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considered. The first one, the already mentioned "National Security Council Memorandum on Agreed Definitions"
from February 1994, in which, apart from the definitions given for proliferation and counterproliferation ("the
activities of DoD across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation including diplomacy, arms control,
export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces and
interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles"),
the nonproliferation concept is defined as "the use of the full range of political, economic and military tools to
prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons
of mass destruction or missiles, should that prove necessary. Nonproliferation tools include: intelligence analysis,
global nonproliferation norms and agreements, diplomacy, export controls, security assurances, defenses, and the
application of military force".58 Although the language is not as clear as it could be, U.S. counterproliferation
policy appears subordinated to, and not distinct from, nonproliferation policy.59
The second document is the Asthon Carter's testimony of April 28, 1994, to the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, in which the close relationship between non- and counterproliferation can be seen.60 Car er
stresses that "in placing new emphasis on countering the effects of proliferation in regional conflict, we are in no
way de-emphasizing our effort to prevent proliferation in the first place... Some commentators have
misinterpreted the counterproliferation initiative to be focused on preemptive attacks on WMD production
facilities. It should be clear from the description of the counterproliferation initiative I have given that our focus
is on the danger that WMD will be used against U.S. citizens, forces, or allies in the course of a regional conflict".
Therefore, following Mr. Carters' argument of the counterproliferation initiative, there is no reason to believe that
counterproliferation substitutes to the nonproliferation regime, although the two concepts share a common goal:
prevention of WMD's proliferation.
Carter mentioned as counterproliferation tools "diplomacy, arms control, export controls, intelligence
collection and analysis". Nevertheless, since many of these tools are used in both non- and counterproliferation,
the two concepts can appear very similar in their goals. But carefully analysing them, some important differences
between non- and counterproliferation can be found. First, nonproliferation is the full panoply of measures taken
to prevent or deter states from acquiring nuclear weapons, while counterproliferation seems, to emphasize
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measures to be taken -defensive and offensive- if nonproliferation fails or is perceived to be about to fail. Second,
counterproliferation places greater emphasis on the use of military force, while nonproliferation puts this emphasis
in the diplomatic efforts. Third, nuclear nonproliferation measures are global or broadly regional,
nondiscriminatory and hence standardized (except in cases where the activities of a state arouse suspicion, in which
case additional and intrusive safeguards must be applied); while some defensive counterproliferation measures
have a general character (e.g., improving defenses against WMD and missiles attack) and are not specifically
directed against any particular adversary, many other counterproliferation measures are necessarily nation-specific
(it would be the case of the offensive counterproliferation measures).61
Other critics point out that counterproliferation is directed against new proliferator and not against those
that had already proliferated. It is neither necessarily directed against all new proliferators62 (only those that were
hostile to the U.S. and its allies, or to its tacit allies such as Israel, which proliferation is consider not bad for the
U.S. interests)63.
The counterproliferation initiative has been also attacked due to their potential damage that a military
conception of nonproliferation may inflict on the existing multinational treaties part of the regime.64 S ecially,
regarding to Article VI of the NPT, "requiring the nuclear-weapon states to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear
disarmament", and arguing that with the counterproliferation initiative, such as objective, reiterated during the
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, would never be implemented,65 and ther fore, counterproliferation
could constitute a threat to the nonproliferation regime, undermining the consensual basis of this.66
In short: counterproliferation should not serve as an excuse to develop new nuclear weapons (or to
increase the number of the nuclear weapon states), to not fulfill the international nonproliferation regime
obligations (such as the negotiation of disarmament and arms control agreements, ratification of agreements such
as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the Chemical Weapon Convention, CWC -in force since April 28 1997-,
among others), the negotiation of a fissile cut-off convention or to refuse to maintain and extend negative security
assurances by the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear ones. By suggesting that the technically advanced
powers may collude to use force against lesser powers, such policies can abet the perception that non-proliferation
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regime exist solely for the self-serving interests of the minority. 
Finally, another common critic towards counterprolideration is that, at the beginning, it was only a U.S.
initiative, and therefore, only unilateral, while the nonproliferation regime, as it has been stressed, has ever been
multilateral. In this sense, the main critic was that although regimes need sanctions, and for security regimes such
as the nonproliferation one, this may include the use of force against violators, sanctions are a matter for the regime
community, not for independent and uncontrolled national (U.S.) actions.67  But nevertheless, with the extension
of the initiative to NATO, this critic is no more valid, taking into consideration that the counterproliferation action
should be agreed upon among states allied in like-minded groups.68
Special attention should be paid to other controversial questions such as the achievement of a clearer
delimitation between activities and duties in charge of the counterproliferation policy and the ones that already has
(on consensual bases) the nonproliferation regime. Positive is the complement of tasks, but not the "supplanting"
(for example in verification of nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states -where already exists the IAEA-
or verification of existing treaties such as the CTBT or the CWC). The use of the nuclear force to respond to a
possible attack needs also more elaboration, specially, in order to determinate what kind of attack (the question
of the legitimacy in the use of nuclear weapons against the use of chemical or biological ones), in what cases and
under what circunstancies (on this issue, although not legally binding, the World Court's historic opinion on the
legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons dated July 8, 1996, should be taken into consideration), the
possibility to apply preemptive counterproliferation measures to avoid proliferation of WMD in peace-time, the
collateral consequences for the population of a military attack (as the North Korean case showed);69 and the role
of the ballistic missiles -that should  never be exaggerated- in a comprehensive counterproliferaiton strategy
(tactical ballistic missiles have a limited military value, but their production and procurement, even of the most
sophisticated types, is relatively cheap).70 All this is related with the threat appreciation, that should be collective
and never be used by a country alone to determine the application of military countermeasures.
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III. INTERNATIONALIZING COUNTERPROLIFERATION
"The only practical counterproliferation measure against nuclear weapons is to create a situation in which
they will never be used, a situation called deterrence" (U.S. President Eisenhower).71
 As we have already seen, the Counterproliferation Initiative is essentially an American concept (and
specifically, a concept from the DoD). But it should be taken into consideration that the application of
countermeasures cannot exclusively be based on the decision of a single country, since it needs for being
successful, international cooperation. The implementation of a policy of counterproliferation in a democratic
Western state is virtually impossible if the state does not have the support of the international community.
Nevertheless, making an international project out of a policy intended primarily to serve the interests of a single
country and carried out by that country strikes as politically dangerous and, in the last instance, very difficult, as
we will see in this part.72
Therefore, we have to consider the extension of the counterproliferation concept, first, to other nuclear
weapon states, and second, to NATO. The Alliance efforts to prevent and confront the proliferation of WMD has
decisive (although politically, very controversial) contributed to the internationalization of the concept, specially,
through the adoption of specific multilateral initiatives.
1. National perspectives and international counterproliferation
As it has been already said, international cooperation was, and is still today, a prerrequsite in order to
guaranty the success of the Northamerican counterproliferation initiative. For this reason, and to avoid justified
accusations of unilateralism, the U.S. should cooperate not only with its traditional allies, but as well with Russia
and key regional powers, and specially with NATO, being this a priority of the America's foreign policy. The first
U.S. initiative demanding international cooperation will be presented to NATO in January 1994, achieving
immediately France's support.
1.1 France
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French nuclear forces have sometimes be described as an important element in the military balance in
Europe. The balance seems to remain an East-West one in French conceptions (that is, the NATO) and friendly
countries in East-Central Europe versus Russia and its former allies.73
The French view of the proliferation threat at the time of the 1994 January Brussels North Atlantic
Council was best reflected in a Defense White paper -Livre Blanc sur la Defense-.  
Among the European nuclear powers, France has moved the farthest towards expanding its nuclear strategy. Under
its chapter on renewed strategies ("Une strategie renouvelée"), the policy paper mentioned counterproliferation as
a new factor, but did not quote it by name (in French circles the use of the term counterproliferation has been
replace by the term Opérations extérieures en milieu extrême -OPMEX-).74 Unlike the British statements, those
of the French take over six pages to specify the changes to the concept of deterrence, the problems of
nonproliferation, and the linkage between these needs and the formulation of a new strategy for the use of
conventional military means that emphasize action, prevention and protection for military forces.75
The White Paper identified NBC and missile proliferation as a serious danger to the nation's vital
interests. The threat was described as twofold: first, "NBC weapons threaten French national territory, currently
form the former Soviet Union, and in future from the Mediterranean basin, especially Algeria"; and second, "NBC
raises the stakes for future intervention by French forces in strategi  zo es outside Europe". In this connection,
France indicated acute concerns that its ability to project power could be radically circumscribed by the spread of
CW and biological weapons (BW) and ballistic-missile capabilities, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
The Paper described proliferation as a key dynamic in reshaping the environment within which France,
Europe and the NATO Alliance would need to defend their interests in the years ahead.76 Paris also wishe  to
benefit from possible technological cooperation with the U.S. and other NATO allies, to maintain U.S. engagement
in NATO and ensure Germany continued to forswear nuclear weapons. The White Paper stated that the nature of
proliferation required many ways of dealing with the problem to seek a balance between the enforcement of
dissuasion, actions of prevention and prohibition, and that every possible way of defence should be taken into
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consideration and defined on the basis of a military strategy to deal with such a threat. For France, deterrence and
counterproliferation were complementary  concepts.77
The most interesting international dimension of the counterproliferation was for Paris the cooperation
with the U.S. in antimissile defense. France did not want to leave the U.S. dominated world market for medium
and longer-range ground-based systems. For this reason the White Paper especially focused on the technological
aspect of the counterproliferation policy.
France's interest in the counterproliferation policy focused on three domains: political (by playing a more
important role than in the previous period in the international forum of negotiations on counterproliferation);
technical (as said, in the field of antimissile defense cooperation) and finally, operational (in geo-strategic terms).78
The French interest and strong support from the beginning to the counterproliferation initiative will be
recompensed after the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit, when the Alliance decides to establish a Defense Group on
Proliferation co-chaired by the United States (represented by Asthon Carter) and France (represented by the
Director of the French Defense Ministry's Délegation aux Affairs Stratégiques, Jean-Claude Mallet). This group
will be in charge of the formulation of the military dimension of the counterproliferaton within NATO.
1.2 The United Kingdom
The British Government reactions to the U.S. DCI has been limited but supportive. It first linked British
nuclear thinking to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in November 1993. In a major analysis of British nuclear
policy, presented to the Centre for Defense Studies at King's College of London, Defense Secretary Malcolm
Rifkind explained how "we and the world community recoil at the through of widespread proliferation of nuclear
weapons". Since "uclear weapons cannot be dis-invented", he stressed that "in terms of our security interests,
therefore, nuclear weapons could be said to be simultaneously part of the solution and part of the problem".79
To counter the regional proliferation threat, the UK advocated a comprehensive political and military
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approach that would both respond to underlining regional and global causation and also provide the operational
military means to deter and defend against the NBC threat. Deterrence of NBC use, primarily through maintaining
a credible nuclear retaliatory capability and a firm declaratory policy was viewed as possible, the military
component's most essential element in the response to proliferation. London supported the need for a NATO
initiative as a means to ensure a credible Alliance response to future regional contingencies even more strongly
than Paris, as well as for the defense of NATO territory beyond the current decade.80
The British Minister of Defense mentioned counterproliferation in January 1994 (as a immediate respond
to NATO demands), in a statement on "UK Defense Strategy: a Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?", stressing
that "the American administration has made countering proliferation a major policy priority. We warmly welcome
this, and we are looking forward to discussions with our NATO allies on this important subject over the coming
months". Nevertheless, it was surprising, that the minister made no reference to the implications of
counterproliferation for the rethinking of nonproliferation issues, considering that the week earlier, at the NATO
summit in Brussels, Alliance leaders discussed arms control and counterproliferation as one of the five main issues
on the agenda.81
In January 1996, the U.K. Minister of Defense told Parliament that any nation aspiring towards ballistic
missile capacity will enable to develop systems capable of threatening the United Kingdom mainland within the
next ten years. On March 28, 1996 the House of Commons' Select Committee on Defense produced a report
entitled "NATO's Southern Flank" stressing, among other things, that "NATO countries should pay close attention
to the long term threat of terrorist use of biological and chemical weapons and should develop appropriate
countermeasures" and that "hand in hand with the diplomatic counterproliferation efforts, NATO should go
practical measures to protect against possible attack"; furthermore, it was said that "the U.K. is currently looking
at various technical options available. A pre-feasible study is under way to identify ballistic missiles systems to
counter potential threats to the UK, dependent territories and our forces deployed overseas".82
In October 1996 a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) conference was held in London to encourage
European discussion on the subject. The Defense Ministry made clear that Britain would have  to collaborate with
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Europe and the USA for economic and political reasons, but Government officers said that the United Kingdom
was not ready to join MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) programme under development.83       
                                                      
1.3 Germany
At the October 1992 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), Volker Rühe, the German defense
minister, said that "NATO's nuclear forces insure us politically against risks that we cannot calculate, risks which
might arise from the proliferation of WMD".84 Nevertheless, prior to the NATO Brussels summit, Germany
appeared to be the most reluctant of the major allies to accept the need for an Alliance defense initiative to counter
the proliferation threat.85
On December 15, 1993 the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, presented a 10-point
nonproliferation initiative to NATO, in which was said, among other things, that "military enforcement measures
against proliferator, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, can only be conceived as ultima ratio in case of
a threat to international security and peace. Military measures necessitate -except in the case of defense against
armed attack- always the legitimation by the U.N. Security Council".86
Although the emphasis in shipping this policy had focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the political
aspects of the challenge and response, Bonn was gradually coming to accept that military force may be necessary
to deal with states that posses NBC capabilities. Germany's preoccupation on the political aspects of the
counterproliferation policy will be also the result of the creation in January 1994 within NATO of a specific group
on political aspects (equivalent to the co-chaired U.S.-French military one) chaired by German Deputy Secretary
General of NATO von Moltke. In this sense, the two points of view on the counterproliferation initiative (the
military, backed by France, and the political one, mainly defended by Germany) will be present within the Alliance.
1.4 Russia
Although not a member of NATO, the possition and support of Russia to the counterproliferation
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initiative was of utmost importance for both the U.S.A. and the Alliance itself.
Russian possition in this field was, that priority in the struggle against proliferation of WMD and their
delivery system
required political methods, while at the same time it did not exclude a combination of political and diplomatic
approaches with coercion measures (economic character) and other restrictive strategies. With respect to the use
of the military force, Russia considered that only in exceptional circumstances, and only when sanctioned by the
UN Security Council, this could be applied.87
But nevertheless, the situation in Russia is made more complex by the fact that even at the terminological
level the concept counterproliferation and its inclusive terms (protection, preemption, prevention, neutralization,
and deterrence) thus far have found no generally accepted linguistic equivalents. For this reason, evident
incompatibility at the levels of conceptual, political, and practical (technological) development of
counterproliferation methodologies in the U.S. and Russian contexts may be one reason, why "official" Russian
experts tend to be fairly critical of U.S. positions on this matter. Another reason was the suspicions about Western
(U.S. and NATO) intentions, perceived as detrimental to Russian interests.88
The most controversial point on this issue was the question of how could affect the counterproliferation
initiative to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and to the theatre missile defense (TBD) and related
capabilities question. It can be said, that there has been an almost instinctive fear that counterproliferation was
intended to revise the foundations of stability in Russian-U.S. strategic relations represented by the same "sacred"
ABM Treaty.89
2. NATO's role
Proliferation is increasingly perceived within the Alliance as both, a political and a military threat that
could undermine  NATO's ability to conduct essential defense missions, both in regional conflicts beyond its
borders and in protecting Alliance territory and populations, especially, as proliferant states acquire longer-range
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and more sophisticated delivery means. Although allies, as we have already seen, continue to differ on the
immediacy of the problem and the most effective means of response, there is an emerging consensus that NATO
should act to protect against this growing threat.90
As a direct result of the Gulf War, the Alliance noted in its 1991 Rome Declaration that "the proliferation
of WMD and their delivery means undermine international security".91 NATO's efforts to address the problem of
proliferation is also present in the Alliance 1991 "New Strategic Concept", which identified the different security
challenges and risks facing member countries after changes in Central and Eastern Europe.92
In late 1993 the U.S. persuaded NATO to create two working groups on counterproliferaiton, which will
explore its political and military aspects. NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and Nuclear Planning Group
(NPG) met in Ministerial Sessions in Brussels on 8 and 9 December 1993, will decide to "intensify efforts to
prevent the proliferation of WMD and to address and counter, if necessary, the associated risks to Alliance
Security".93
Following President Clinton's emphasis at the 1994 January Brussels NATO Summit on the danger to
Alliance members for NBC proliferation, significant (although politically controversial) progresses were made in
integrating counterproliferation policy into the new Alliance's post-Cold War agenda. By then, NATO made some
central assumptions in assessing which countries were likely to be proliferators of weapons of mass destruction:
countries that can manufacture such weapons probably will do so; countries that face serious threats will develop
weapons to the best of their capabilities and finally, countries will develop weapons of mass destruction to enhance
their diplomatic influence.94
The Declaration of the  North Atlantic Council stated that "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery means constitute a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have
decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defense efforts against proliferation, taking into account the
work already underway in other international fora and institutions. In this regard, we direct that work begin
immediately in appropriate form of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to
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reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it".95
Three groups were subsequently created: The Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP), which monitors
overall Alliance efforts; the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), which focuses on how NATO
can reinforce traditional nonproliferation efforts; and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), which
examines the defense aspects of proliferation, including the military capabilities needed to discourage NBC
proliferation, deter NBC use, and if necessary, protect NATO territory, populations, and forces.96
Nevertheless, in the discussions leading up to the Brussels NATO Council meeting, the Europeans
pressed for the inclusion of counterproliferation's political implications, rather than an exclusive focus on the
military aspects of counterproliferation, and they insisted on giving precedence to traditional means of
nonproliferation policy. A procedural compromise within NATO was achieved in January 1994 by establishing,
as it has been already seen,  two working groups, one on political aspects, chaired by (German) Deputy Secretary
General of NATO von Moltke, and the other one on the military aspects co-chaired by the U.S. and France.97
Five months later, in its June 9, 1994 Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (issued at the Ministerial meeting  of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul), NATO placed
proliferation risks high on its new agenda, but the document is devoted to straightening time-honoured
nonproliferation policies.98 In its discussion of military efforts, the "communiqué" dos not use the term
counterproliferation once (presumably due to resistance from the West European countries and a lack of American
insistence). Therefore, nothing could better express NATO's cautions attitude towards the U.S. counterproliferation
initiative.99 The Alliance observed, inter allia, that: "a number of states on the periphery of the Alliance continue
in their attempts to develop or acquire the capability to produce WMD and their delivery means or to acquire
illegally such systems; WMD and their delivery means can pose a direct military risk to the member states of the
Alliance and their forces and WMD proliferation can occur despite international non-proliferation norms and
agreements". In responding to these risks, the Policy Framework stresses that "NATO's approach must incorporate
both political and military capabilities", "to discourage WMD proliferation and use...".100
The SGP addressed the political aspects NATO's approach to the proliferation problem. In responding
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to the risks of proliferation, the principal objective of Alliance policy will be to prevent proliferation or, if it
occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means. But nevertheless NATO also recognized, that political efforts to
prevent proliferation may not always be successful. For this reason, the DGP was tasked to address the military
capabilities needed to discourage nuclear, biological and chemical weapons' proliferation, deter threats or use of
NBC weapons and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces.101
The work of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation was broken down into three phases. In the first
one, completed in December 1994, the DGP conducted an assessment of the risks posed to Alliance by the
proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. Drawing upon NATO intelligence assessments, the DGP's Risk
Assessment validated the June 1994 Summit Declaration, which noted that proliferation of WMD and their
delivery means possessed a real security challenge to NATO (but introduced differences among attributes and uses
that possess NBC weapons: nuclear weapons, appearing to be the most prized by proliferant states; biological
weapons, less threatening than nuclear ones, but emerging as a key threat and finally, chemical weapons, seen by
proliferant states as both, an effective military tool and an instrument of terror); spelled out in detail the growing
proliferation risks on NATO's periphery due to indigenous production or illicit transfer; concluded that these
weapons could pose new threats to NATO's civilian populations and territory and make more difficult for NATO
forces to prosecute; and suggested that the challenge of ballistic missiles needed to be studied further.102
From this analysis, the DGP derived the main principles to guide NATO's defense response to
proliferation, and support the Alliance's objectives for dealing with it: ensure Alliance cohesion through continued
widespread participation allied defense preparations for operations in the NBC proliferation risk environment;
maintain freedom of action and demonstrate to any potential adversary that the Alliance will not be coerced by the
threat or use of NBC weapons; reassure both, Allies and coalition partners of the Alliance's ability effectively to
respond to, or protect against, NBC threats or attacks; ensure responsive and effective consultation procedures to
resolve crisis which have a potential NBC dimension at the earliest possible stage; complement non-proliferation
efforts; complement nuclear deterrence; balance a mix of capabilities including nuclear forces and conventional
response capabilities to devalue a proliferant's NBC weapons by denying the military advantages they would
confer; prioritize needed capabilities in terms of their contribution to Alliance objectives; conflict control; evolve
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capabilities; emphasise system mobility and finally, integrate NBC-related processes.103
The DGP Phase II effort was completed in November 1995, considering the implications of proliferation
for allied planing and identified a range of capabilities needed to support NATO's defense posture for dealing with
proliferation. For this purpose, NATO examined threats or attacks both, on NATO territory and population, and
risks posed to NATO forces in out of area operations. Nothing that military capabilities complement political
efforts to prevent proliferation, the DGP found that a mixture of capabilities was necessary to provide a firm basis
for deterring or protecting against the proliferation risk.104 At the same time, the DPC and the NPG recognized
in their joint November 29, 1995, that an appropriate mix of conventional response capabilities, to include active
defenses, would complement Alliance nuclear forces and reinforce NATO's overall deterrence posture against
threats posed by proliferation.105
Finally, Phase III concluded in June 1996. This phase contained assessment of current capabilities,
identification of deficiencies, an recommendations for correction. Reflecting the political importance attached to
proliferation issues, the Defense Ministers directed, that an accelerated process be instituted to correct within
shorter time frame than would normally be the case any shortfalls in capabilities identified by DGP's work. This
was the first time in 12 years, that this accelerated force planing tool was used.106
During 1996 and 1997 NATO has continued backed its support to nonproliferation of WMD, and the
DGP, examining the implications of NBC weapons -in particular chemical and biological ones- for NATO defense
planning and requirements in these scenarios. All this has been reflected in the Final Communiqué of the Berlin
Ministerial Meeting of NAC  (June 3, 1996), in the joint June 13, 1996 DPC and NPG Final Communiqué, in
the Final Communiqué of the Brussels Ministerial Meeting of NAC (December 10 and December 17-18,
respectively), in the joint December 17, 1996 DPC and NPG Final Communiqué, in the Final Communiqué of
the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Simtra (May 29, 1997) and finally, in the Final Communique of the
Ministerial Meetings of the DPC and NPG held on June 12, 1997 (in which once more, priority is given, for longer
term planning,  to the capabilities needed to deter, and if necessary respond to, the use of WMD, in the 1998 force
proposals).107
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In the Meeting of the NAC in Defense Ministers Session held in Brussels on December 17 and 18, 1996,
it was expressly recognized that "enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear
posture, and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on
the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy -and
we do not foresee any future need to do so".108
Finally, the possible defense implications that could have the proliferation of WMD for NATO should
also be considered.  First, the greatest threat presented by NBC and missile proliferation, at least in the near future,
is to deploy forces in regional contingencies. Therefore, NATO should give first priority to the protection of its
forces. As adversaries acquire longer-range systems, the focus of Alliance effort may shift to the protection of
NATO populations. Second, proliferants states do no have the ability to defeat NATO members in classic military
terms, so that adversaries may view its possession of NBC as an effective means to overcome NATO's
conventional superiority. Third, NBC weapons could have a direct impact on the outcome of an operation by
disrupting coalition cohesion or inhibiting the ability of NATO to deploy forces. Fourth, forces will be most
vulnerable to NBC attack while entering the region of conflict, when large numbers of forces are concentrated at
a relatively small number of airfields and ports. Fifth, NBC weapons could alter the military balance of NATO
operational forces essential to the conflict. Sixth, uneven capabilities among coalition partners with regard to
equipment and training for NBC operations and for defending against the missile threat, could offer the enemy
opportunities for exploitation,and  finally, reaction by the civilian population within theatre of operations could
also have fundamental effect on NATO's ability to conduct operations.109
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CONCLUSION
Taken into consideration all the above, some conclusions and recommendations can be made:
- Preventing the spread of WMD remains a shared objective and a first priority by the majority of states
in the world. The question is therefore, how it can be achieved, through counterproliferation initiatives
or through nonproliferation ones. The best solution is a combination of both, in a complementary relation
rather than in superiority terms. Counter- and nonproliferation seek both to reduce the demand for
weapons of mass destruction and for this reason counterproliferation options must support and not
undermine traditional nonproliferation measures.
- Counterproliferation should take into consideration the following triad: effective and guaranteed non-
proliferation, disarmament and ensuring global and regional security.
- Counterproliferation consists not only of military measures; it also includes diplomacy, deterrence, arms
control, coercive and cooperative disarmament, economic and military assistance, sanctions and
embargoes, intelligence, export controls, security assurances and guarantees, stabilizing measures,
adapting response capabilities, lethal and nonlethal countermeasures, active and passive defenses and
military operations (included  preemptive actions). For this reason, counterproliferation needs
technological support.
- Involvement of nuclear weapons in the counterproliferation debate could have negative implications for
eventual nuclear disarmament and international cooperation within the nonproliferation regime. 
However, by focusing on how best to respond to WMD's use, does not deal with the question of what
influences states to acquire WMD in the first place.
- Institutionalizing the right of states to take individually military actions against possible "proliferators"
in time of peace, without attending the U.N. Charter or the NPT, seems as being very problematic. There
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is to be considered, that it will remain necessary to seek the support of the U.N. Security Council before
the aircraft or the missiles leave the ground or the launching platform. Therefore, the question of
possibilities of adopting sanctions is relevant not only for the military perspective, but also for the
political one.
- A military counterproliferation strategy would have to cope with difficulties and risks (for example, the
collateral consequences of a military attack on a possible proliferator). It should therefore remain an
option of last resort, and even if one takes the view that despite there many problems involved, military
responses to the proliferation of WMD should not ruled out in principle, one should be extremely careful
in selecting military options.
- Special attention should be paid to the consequences of using the military force to prevent another country
from acquiring WMDs before its efforts bore fruit, or preempting the use of such weapons in a crisis, but
before a conflict started (for example, the case of the Korean Peninsula).
- Counterproliferation can be used not only against weapons themselves, but earlier in the proliferation
process, for example, to avoid exports or to disrupt or destroy research and development or production
facilities, and thus also support a prevention strategy. But it should be considered, that all responses will
be conventional, because the Pentagon has rules out employment of nuclear weapons for
counterproliferation purposes. This aspect can also represent a problem for NATO's counterproliferation
strategy.
- A key requirement is to develop a clear policy on how to respond to the use of WMD when Western
countries have no chemical and biological weapons of their own; while the use of nuclear weapons seems
to many to be certain to prompt a nuclear response, their utility in responding to CBW is perceived to
be more problematical.
- If further nuclear proliferation is to be prevented, the priority should be to develop new global and
regional security structures and to enhance intelligence capabilities and the IAEA safeguards system.
33
- Implementation of a policy of counterproliferation in a Western state is virtually impossible if the state
does not have the support of the international community. Therefore, counterproliferation can only work,
if it enjoys multilateral support and is followed by multilateral actions. It needs cooperation with other
countries.
- Following President Clinton's emphasis at the January 1994 NATO Summit on the danger to Alliance
members from WMD proliferation, significant progress has been made in integrating counterproliferation
policy into the new Alliance's post-Cold War agenda.
- Today, the Alliance is dealt with proliferation as one of its key missions. Nevertheless, difficulties among
allies are evident, if we look for example NATO's predilection for the concept "defense response to the
WMD proliferation risk", instead of "counterproliferation".
- The political dimension of the Alliance Framework on the Proliferation of WMDs is intended to prevent
proliferation from occurring and, if that fails, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this way, the
work at the political level complements the work done at the defence level. While the defence dimension
of the Framework addressed potential capabilities, the political dimension looks at potential intentions.
- The success of the NATO initiative to counter the proliferation threat will depend on the allies national
and collective commitments to field the necessary military capabilities and embed the threat in the
Alliance defense planning process. Therefore, a reformulation within NATO on existing positions on
nuclear deterrence and need for wide-area missile defenses, will be presumably necessary.
- Budgetary restrictions could make difficult to go ahead and maintain all the counterproliferation programs
(specially those referred to ballistic missile defenses). For this reason, NATO has to precisely define its
priorities with respect to the proliferation threat, and about deterrence and defenses, searching for support
to its initiatives in the common interest of the allies, rather than in national perspectives of the threat, that
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can result detrimental for the Alliance or be subject of further suspicions among member states.
- Finally, it can be said that NATO's contribution in this field, apart from been decisive, still offers a lot
of possibilities for the near future.
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